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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW & THE FIRST
AMENDMENT-CAN YOU SEE THE LIGHT?: ILLUMINATING PRECEDENT AND
CREATING A NEW TIER OF JUDICIAL SCRUTINY FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE
LAWS. Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006).
I. INTRODUCTION
Anyone who reads the newspaper or follows politics knows that the
amount of money a candidate for political office raises is an accurate indica-
tor of how a candidate will perform at the polls. Often headlines read "Can-
didate A Raises More Money Than Candidate B" rather than highlighting
the candidates' differences on important issues.' Inevitably, a scandal about
misappropriation of campaign funds saturates the news, or the public be-
comes frustrated with the inordinate amount of money involved in cam-
paigns. In response, legislators pass a law to alleviate the problem. Conse-
quently, someone, usually a politician or a political party, challenges this
new law as a violation of their right to free speech and association because
they cannot raise as much money as they want and spend it the way they
want. Like a vicious cycle, these events have reoccurred since the genesis of
campaign finance laws in this country.2
Recently, this cycle occurred in Vermont. The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to hear a challenge to the Vermont Campaign
Finance Reform Act (Act 64), which established limits on the amount of
money a candidate could accept-contribution limits-and the amount of
money a candidate could spend-expenditure limits. In Randall v. Sorrell,4 a
plurality of the justices held that both Act 64's contribution limits and ex-
penditure limits were unconstitutional.' This result was somewhat surpris-
ing, as many legal scholars and political pundits thought the Court would
change its stance on expenditure limits, which had been unconstitutional
since Buckley v. Valeo,6 a watershed campaign finance case.7 In Randall,
1. See Dan Balz, Fundraising Totals Challenge Early Campaign Assumptions, WASH.
POST, Apr. 17, 2007, at A24; David D. Kirkpatrick & Aron Pilhofer, Filings on Campaign
Finances Offer Glimpses Into Operations of the Candidates, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2007, at
Al; Lynn Sweet, Obama Gaining in the Money Race; Clinton Has More on Hand, but Illi-
nois Senator Outraised Her in the First Three Months of '07, According to Reports They've
Filed, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Apr. 16, 2007, at News 8.
2. See discussion infra Part II.A.
3. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 2801-2883 (1997).
4. 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006).
5. Id. at 2500.
6. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
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however, the plurality quickly ruled Act 64's expenditure limits unconstitu-
tional because of Buckley and stare decisis. 8 The plurality gave no indication
that it would change its stance on expenditure limits, and only Justice Ste-
vens argued for their constitutionality.9 For the first time in its history the
Court struck down contribution limits.' ° The plurality, still relying on Buck-
ley, ruled that Act 64's contribution limits were unconstitutionally low." An
unexpected importance of Randall, therefore, is its re-enforcement of Buck-
ley as the binding authority for contribution and expenditure limits.
Just as Randall helped reaffirm Buckley, it also clarified what standard
of review the Court uses for contribution limit challenges. The Buckley
Court ruled that contribution limits must be "closely drawn" to serve a "suf-
ficiently important" governmental interest. 2 But the Court never stated
whether this standard was rational basis, intermediate, or strict scrutiny. 3
This note suggests that Randall illuminates what the Buckley Court hinted at
thirty years prior-that the Court established a new tier of scrutiny for con-
tribution limits.
This note begins by examining the history of campaign finance laws in
the United States, paying special attention to Buckley, the seminal 1976 de-
cision that provided the framework for the Randall Court. 4 Next, the note
sets forth the facts leading up to the Court's decision in Randall.5 The note
then explores the Randall opinion-including important concurrences and
dissents.' 6 Finally, the note analyzes the importance of the decision and why
the term "semi-strict scrutiny" best describes the Court's standard of review
for contribution limits.
17
7. See Richard Briffault, A Changing Supreme Court Considers Major Campaign
Finance Questions: Randall v. Sorrell, and Wisconsin Right to Life v. FEC, 5 ELECTION L.J.
74, 82-93 (2006) (proposing that with two new members to the Court and the other members
sharply divided over Buckley, the Court may overrule Buckley and allow expenditure limits);
Richard L. Hasen, Buckley is Dead, Long Live Buckley: The New Campaign Finance Inco-
herence of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 31, 67-72 (2004)
(arguing that McConnell set up the Court to allow expenditure limits); Linda Greenhouse,
Justices Take on Spending Limits for Candidates, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2005, at AI (suggest-
ing that by taking Randall v. Sorrell the Court might be ready to change its jurisprudence on
spending limits).
8. See Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2488-91.
9. Id. at 2506-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
10. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Kennedy Court, 9 GREEN BAG 2d 335, 344 (2006).
11. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2500; see discussion infra Part II1.B. I.
12. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curium) (citing Cousins v. Wigoda,
419 U.S. 477, 488 (1975); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)).
13. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
14. See discussion infra Part II.
15. See discussion infra Part III.A.
16. See discussion infra Part IlI.B.




This section traces the history of Supreme Court campaign finance law
jurisprudence regarding contribution and expenditure limits. 8 First, it will
briefly discuss the history of campaign finance laws in this country and the
Supreme Court's approach to campaign finance law before Buckley. 9
Second, this section will examine Buckley, the seminal campaign finance
case that established the current constitutional framework for campaign
finance laws.2° This section will conclude with an overview of the Court's
post-Buckley jurisprudence.21
A. Pre-Buckley: Campaign Finance Law History and Case Law Before
1976
Campaign finance laws in America originated as a response to chang-
ing social conditions in the late nineteenth century.22 The expansion of in-
dustry after the Civil War led to a concentration of wealth in the higher le-
vels of society.23 As money began to accumulate in the upper class, a senti-
ment grew among the general public that these "deep pockets" were nega-
tively influencing politics. 24 State legislatures responded in the 1890s by
passing laws that required campaigns to disclose accepted contributions to
the public.25 After Theodore Roosevelt's victory in the 1904 presidential
election, the influence of corporations in politics became a national issue.26
Soon Congress began to conduct hearings and to propose legislation "de-
signed to cleanse the political process. 27 The result was legislation forbid-
ding corporations from making monetary contributions to political cam-
18. See discussion infra Part II.
19. See discussion infra Part II.A.
20. See discussion infra Part II.B.
21. See discussion infra Part II.C.
22. See generally United States v. Int'l Union United Auto., Aircraft and Agric. Imple-
ment Workers of Am., 352 U.S. 567 (1957) ("Automobile Workers"). The Supreme Court
provided an excellent history of campaign finance law in America in this case. See id. at 570-
84.
23. Id. at 570.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 570-71.
26. Id. at 571-72. Shortly after losing the election, Roosevelt's opponent, Alton Parker,
said, "[t]he greatest moral question which now confronts us is, Shall the trusts and corpora-
tions be prevented from contributing money to control or aid in controlling elections?" Id. at
572 (quoting Hearings Before House Comm. on Elections, 59th Cong. 56 (1906)). Roosevelt
responded to the concerns by calling on Congress to completely prohibit contributions by
corporations. Id.
27. Id. at 573.
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paigns.28 In 1910, in a further attempt to eliminate the appearance of the
influence of wealth in politics, Congress passed a law with various disclo-
sure requirements mandating that contributors publicly acknowledge the
amount of money they gave to a candidate or political committee.29
In 1925, Congress passed the Corrupt Practices Act, in part due to pub-
lic uproar following the Teapot Dome scandal.30 Another factor that led
Congress to pass the Corrupt Practices Act was the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Newberry v. United States,3 in which the Court struck down federal
regulation of Senate primary races.32 The most important aspect of the Cor-
rupt Practices Act was the increased public disclosure requirements. 33 Dur-
ing the New Deal era Congress passed several more campaign finance laws,
but the Court never handed down any significant rulings about their consti-
tutionality.34 The Court's approach to defining the constitutionality of cam-
paign finance laws before Buckley was to avoid the issue altogether.35
In United States v. International Union United Automobile, Aircraft
and Agriculture Implement Workers of America 36 ("Automobile Workers"),
the government appealed a Michigan district court decision dismissing an
indictment against a labor union for allegedly violating the Corrupt Practices
Act.37 The relevant provision of that law provided that no corporations or
labor organizations could make a contribution or expenditure that had any
connection with a candidate for federal office.38 In determining whether the
Corrupt Practices Act was constitutional, the majority did not discuss the
First Amendment implications.39 The Court decided that it was unnecessary
to determine the "more or less abstract issues of constitutional law" in order
28. Automobile Workers, 352 U.S. at 575.
29. Id. at 575-76.
30. Bradley A. Smith, Hamilton at Wits End: The Lost Discipline of the Spending
Clause vs. the False Discipline of Campaign Finance Reform, 4 CHAP. L. REv. 117, 132
(2001). The Teapot Dome scandal involved the Secretary of the Interior, who awarded an oil
magnate a lucrative oil lease of federal land in return for money and gifts. Lauren Eber, Note,
Waiting for Watergate: The Long Road to FEC Reform, 79 S. CAL. L. REv. 1155, 1161
(2006) (suggesting that the Watergate scandal was the type of event necessary to lead to
effective campaign finance reform).
31. 256 U.S. 232 (1921) (holding that Congress did not have the power to limit expendi-
tures in federal primary elections).
32. Automobile Workers, 352 U.S. at 576 (citing Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S.
232 (1921)).
33. Kenneth A. Gross, The Enforcement of Campaign Finance Rules: A System in
Search of Reform, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 279, 281 (1991).
34. Smith, supra note 30.
35. See Automobile Workers, 352 U.S. at 592-93.
36. 352 U.S. 567 (1957).
37. Id. at 568.
38. Id. at 568-69.
39. Id. at 570-84.
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to adjudicate the case.4" It simply remanded the case, holding that the district
court incorrectly interpreted the statute in making its decision to dismiss the
indictment.4 Justice Douglas, however, in his dissenting opinion, viewed
the challenged law as a clear violation of the First Amendment right of free
speech.42 Indeed, he argued that the law did not pass the strict scrutiny stan-
dard required for laws challenged on the basis of free speech.43 By not ruling
on the constitutionality of the expenditure and contribution limits, the law
stayed intact, and, more importantly, the Court did not establish a precedent
for the Buckley Court to follow nineteen years later."
B. Buckley Sets the Bar
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, another wave of public sentiment
that money was influencing politics on a large scale hit the national scene,
leading Congress to pass the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) in
1971 .5 The Watergate scandal and further congressional findings of corrup-
tion in politics led to amendments to FECA, which included the creation of
the Federal Election Commission (FEC).46 In response to a constitutional
challenge to FECA, the Court in Buckley v. Valeo47 finally ruled on the con-
stitutionality of contribution and expenditure limits.48 The Buckley Court
ruled that FECA's contribution limits were constitutional but its expenditure
limits were not.49 Response to the Buckley decision was mostly negative
then and still is among a majority of the Justices, but it remains the binding
authority on campaign finance law."
1. Contribution Limits Are Constitutional
The challenged provision of FECA called for a $1000 limit on contri-
butions from individuals or groups to candidates or a candidate's political
40. Id. at 592.
41. Id. at 592-93.
42. Automobile Workers, 352 U.S. at 594-98 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 596-97.
44. Allison R. Hayward, The Per Curiam Opinion of Steel: Buckley v. Valeo as Super-
precedent? Clues from Wisconsin and Vermont, 2006 CATO SUP. CT. REv. 195, 206 (2006).
45. J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an
Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 609, 610 (1982) (arguing that Buckley
actually allows money to negatively influence politics).
46. Eber, supra note 30, at 1163-65.
47. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
48. Id. at 58-59.
49. Id. at 23.




action committee (PAC) during any federal election.51 It also prohibited any
contributor from giving more than $25,000 in one year.52 The government
argued that FECA's provision "regulated conduct, and that its effects on free
speech and association were incidental."53 The petitioners contended that the
contribution limits directly violated the First Amendment right of political
speech.4
As opposed to the Court in Automobile Workers, the Buckley Court di-
rectly addressed the First Amendment concerns implicated by the contribu-
tion limits.55 The main problem raised by contribution limits was the burden
imposed on the freedom of political association, thus subjecting the law "to
the closest scrutiny."56 The Court acknowledged that the right to associate
was not absolute, however, and the government could impose even a signifi-
cant interference if the law was "closely drawn" to meet a "sufficiently im-
portant interest."57 As this note will explore later, Buckley was unclear as to
whether the Court considered the closest scrutiny standard as intermediate
or strict scrutiny, or something in between.5
The Court agreed with the government's argument that the contribution
limits served a sufficiently important government interest-preventing the
corruption and the appearance of corruption caused by the real and per-
ceived influence of large contributions in political campaigns. 9 The Court
noted that in light of the actual corruption Congress uncovered after the
1972 presidential elections and the effect that actual and perceived corrup-
tion had on the public, the government had a strong interest that justified the
$1000 contribution limit.'
Turning to the second element of its standard of review, the Court re-
jected the petitioners' argument that the contribution limits were not closely
drawn because bribery laws and disclosure requirements presented less re-
strictive means of fulfilling the governmental interest.6' The Court deferred
51. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 24.
52. Id. at 7.
53. Id. at 15.
54. Id.
55. See id. at 24-26.
56. Id. at 24-25 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958)).
57. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25 (citing Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 488 (1975);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)).
58. See discussion infra Part II.C.
59. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25.
60. Id. at 26-27. See also the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit's decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 839-40 & nn.36-38 (1975) (noting
that congressional findings of corruption included large contributions by the dairy lobby to
President Nixon's campaign in order to get White House meetings, by the American Dental
Association, by current and potential ambassadors, and by Ross Perot).
61. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27-28.
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to Congress, which believed that the bribery and disclosure laws were not
sufficient to prevent corruption and its appearance, thus making the contri-
bution ceilings necessary.6 2 The Court believed that contribution limits only
marginally restricted free speech rights because a contribution serves more
as a symbolic gesture that does not change with the size of the contribu-
tion.63 According to the Court, contribution limits bear more heavily on the
right of political association than on free speech rights, but FECA's limits
were not so stringent that they prevented contributors from joining a politi-
cal association or volunteering in a political association's efforts to elect or
defeat a candidate.' Concluding that the government had satisfied both ele-
ments of the standard of review, the Court held that the $1000 contribution
limits served the "weighty" government interests sufficiently to justify the
limited infringements on First Amendment freedoms.65
2. Expenditure Limits Are Unconstitutional
a. Limitations on campaign expenditures by a candidate
FECA placed a limit on the amount of money that a candidate could
spend during primary and general elections. 66 The Court held that these limi-
tations violated the First Amendment protection of political expression.67
The Court applied an "exacting scrutiny" standard, which applied when de-
termining whether governmental interests justify the burden placed on polit-
ical expression rights.6' The Court concluded that the government had not
suggested an interest in capping the amount of money a candidate could
spend that was sufficient to justify the restrictions on political speech.69 The
main interest served by expenditure limitations, the Court noted, was pre-
venting candidates from depending on large contributions to run their cam-
paigns.70 The Court reasoned that the contribution limits served this interest
62. Id. at 28.
63. Id. at 20-21. The Court stated that "[a]t most, the size of the contribution provides a
very rough index of the intensity of the contributor's support for the candidate." Id at 21.
64. Id. at 22.
65. Id. at 29.
66. Id. at 54.
67. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 58-59.
68. Id. at 44-45. The Court gave no citations for where it derived the "exacting scrutiny"
standard. See id. Based on later opinions, however, it appears that "exacting scrutiny" is
actually "strict scrutiny." See Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2502 (2006) (Thomas, J.,
concurring); McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 307 (2003).




and imposed less restrictions on political speech, thus nullifying the need for
expenditure limits.7'
The Court also disagreed that reducing the "skyrocketing" costs of
campaigns was an important governmental interest. 72 To restrict spending in
turn restricts the scope of the campaign, and "[t]he First Amendment denies
government the power to determine that spending to promote one's political
views is wasteful, excessive, or unwise. 73 Thus, the Court held that FECA's
limit on how much a candidate could spend on a campaign was an unconsti-
tutional violation of political speech.74
b. Limitation of expenditures by a non-candidate
Expenditure limits placed on non-candidates was also an unacceptable
burden on the First Amendment right of political speech.75 FECA placed a
$1000 limitation on how much an individual or group could spend "relative
to a clearly identified candidate., 76 The government again argued that this
limit served the important interest of preventing corruption and its appear-
ance. 77 The government added that non-candidates wishing to influence the
election could avoid the contribution limits by directly paying for adver-
tisements supporting the candidate.78 In rejecting these arguments, the Court
decided that the expenditure limits did not sufficiently serve the govern-
ment's interests to justify the heavy burdens placed on the First Amendment
guarantee of freedom of expression. 79 The government had not proved large
expenditures by non-candidates posed the same dangers as large contribu-
tions to candidates. 80 In response to the government's suggestion that non-
candidates could avoid the contribution limits by directly paying for adver-
tisements, the Court reasoned that if a non-candidate coordinated the ex-
penditure with the candidate, then the expenditure would count as a contri-
bution under FECA.81 As for expenditures not coordinated with the candi-
date, the Court maintained those types of expenditures may not provide
much assistance to a campaign and may even be counterproductive. 82 Ac-
71. Id.
72. Id. at 57.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 58-59.
75. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 50.
76. Id. at 39. Act 64's most similar provision is § 2809(b)-(c). See discussion infra Part
IIM.A. 1.c.
77. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47-48.
78. Id. at 46.
79. Id. at 47-48.
80. Id. at 45.
81. Id. at 46-47.
82. Id. at 47.
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cording to the Court, instead of preventing a non-candidate from avoiding
the contribution limits, expenditure limits substantially restricted indepen-
dent advocacy even though there is little possibility that non-candidates
could effectively circumvent contribution limits.8 3
In the alternative, the government argued the expenditure limits on per-
sons other than the candidate helped equalize the ability of non-candidates
to influence the outcome of elections.84 The Court flatly rejected this conten-
tion, stating, "the concept that government may restrict the speech of some
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is
wholly foreign to the First Amendment."85 The plain effect of the indepen-
dent expenditure limits, according to the Court, was to prevent all individu-
als and groups other than the press and political organizations from advocat-
ing their opinion about a candidate if it cost them more than $1000 a year.86
Although contribution limits only marginally restricted speech freedoms, the
expenditure limits restricted the quantity of speech, the depth of the issues
discussed, and the size of the audience.87 The Court held that the expenditure
limits violated the First Amendment right to freedom of political expres-
sion."
C. Post-Buckley
1. The Court Attempts to Clarify Buckley and Extends It to the States
For over two decades, the Buckley decision percolated throughout the
circuits, with the lower courts confused about exactly what standards Buck-
ley required.8 9 It was unclear, for example, whether Buckley's holding on
83. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47.
84. Id. at 48.
85. Id. at 48-49.
86. Id. at 39-40. The Court noted that this provision would make it a federal offense for
such an individual or group to buy a single quarter-page advertisement in support of a candi-
date in a major newspaper. Id. at 40.
87. Id. at 19.
88. Id. at 51.
89. For example, four cases define the Eighth Circuit's jurisprudence regarding contri-
bution limits since Buckley. See Erin Buford Vinett, Note, The Supreme Court Halts the
Eighth Circuit's Invalidation of State Campaign Contribution Limits, 23 U. ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L. Rev. 243 (2001). In Day v. Holahan, the court held that the $100 limit per year
contribution limit to political committees imposed by the Minnesota legislature was so low
that it violated contributors' rights to free political association and expression. 34 F.3d 1356,
1365 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1127 (1995). In Carver v. Nixon, the court inva-
lidated a Minnesota law that limited contributions to candidates for statewide office to $300
for the same reason. 72 F.3d 633, 645 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
The Eighth Circuit struck down an Arkansas law limiting contributions to $300 to candidates
for statewide offices on the same basis. Russell v. Burris, 146 F.3d 563, 568-71 (8th Cir.
2007]
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contribution limits applied to candidates for state office.9" Courts also were
uncertain whether Buckley defined the dollar amount that states could im-
pose.91 The level of scrutiny for contribution limits was also unknown.92
In Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC 3 ("Shrink"), the Court
held that Buckley applied to state election laws, but the contribution limits
did not have to "be pegged to Buckley's dollars., 94 The Missouri statute un-
der review used a complicated formula to determine the contribution limit
for each candidate. 95 At the time the plaintiff filed the lawsuit, the highest
limit was $1075 for candidates for statewide office and for other candidates
in districts with more than 250,000 people, and the lowest limit was $275
for candidates for state representative and for other candidates in districts
with less than 100,000 people. 96
In deciding whether Buckley should apply to state regulations, the
Shrink Court was short and direct. 97 In the opening paragraph of the deci-
sion, the Court stated that the issue was in front of the Court, and Buckley
indeed applied to state election laws.98 Obviously, Buckley applied to state
election laws because of incorporation-Buckley concerned First Amend-
ment issues, and those issues are incorporated to the states through the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.99 Thus, the question before
the Court was whether the states, and in this case Missouri, could assert the
same governmental interests that Congress asserted in Buckley--preventing
corruption and its appearance." The Court answered this question affirma-
tively, noting that even without the authority of Buckley, there would be no
serious doubt about the legitimacy of the governmental interests claimed.'
1998), cert. denied, Burris v. Russell, 525 U.S. 1001 (1998). The court applied strict scrutiny
in each case. Id. at 568. Additionally, in Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377
(2000) ("Shrink"), rev'd, Shrink Mo. Gov' Committee PAC v. Adams, 161 F.3d 519 (8th Cir.
1998), the Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit's ruling that Missouri's contribution
limits were unconstitutionally low. Shrink, 528 U.S. at 385 (2000); see discussion infra Part
II.C.1.
90. See Shrink, 528 U.S. at 381-82 (2000).
91. Seeid.at382.
92. Id. at 386. "Precision about the relative rigor of the standard to review contribution
limits was not a pretense of the Buckley per curiam opinion." Id.
93. 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
94. Id. at 381-82.
95. Id. at 382-83.
96. Id. at 383.
97. See id. at 381-82.
98. Id. at 381-82.
99. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 489 n.1 (1996).




The Shrink Court also held that Buckley did not specify a floor under
which states could set contribution limits.10 2 The Court rejected the argu-
ment that when adjusted for inflation, Missouri's contributions limits were
below the Buckley limit and thus unconstitutional. °3 Instead, Buckley estab-
lished a test for determining whether contribution limits were too low-a
limit is constitutionally impermissible if it prevents a candidate from raising
sufficient money and resources to run an effective campaign.' " Thus, al-
though the contribution limit established by the Missouri legislature was
lower than the limit upheld in Buckley when adjusted for inflation, the Mis-
souri statute did not prevent a candidate from running an effective cam-
paign.'l 5 Therefore, the law was constitutional.
0 6
Finally, the Shrink Court attempted to clarify what standard of scrutiny
courts should use when determining whether contribution limits violated the
First Amendment.10 7 First, the Court commented that although Buckley was
clear that contribution limits infringed more on the right to associate than on
the right to free speech, a challenge based on either right would receive the
same standard of review.'0 8 Further, the Court reasoned that if a contribution
limit could survive an associational right challenge then it would also sur-
vive a free speech challenge.'0 9 Significantly, the Court expressly rejected
the notion that contribution limits were subject to intermediate scrutiny,
regardless of whether the challenge was on association or speech grounds." 0
According to the Shrink Court, to be constitutional under Buckley's standard
of scrutiny, a contribution limit that significantly interfered with the right of
association must be "closely drawn" to serve a "sufficiently important inter-
est.""' Although the Shrink Court denied using intermediate scrutiny to re-
view challenges to contribution limits,' 12 it did not clarify exactly what level
of scrutiny it applied in reviewing these cases.
2. Soft Money Is Subject to the Same Scrutiny as Contribution Limits
In the years following Buckley, several new species of campaign tools
emerged that enabled politicians, lobbyists, and large contributors to avoid
102. Id. at 396.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 397 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976) (per curiam)).
105. Id. at 396-97.
106. Shrink, 528 U.S. at 397-98.
107. Id. at 387-88.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 388.
110. Id. at386.
Il1. Id. at 387-88 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25, 30 (1976)).
112. Shrink, 528 U.S. at 386.
2007]
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FECA's regulation of contributions." 3 One of the new tools was the use of
"soft money," which, unlike "hard money," was not subject to FECA and
Buckley contribution limits." 4 Soft money is a contribution to a political
party-usually made by corporations, unions, and individuals who have
already exceeded the contribution limit-for activities intended to influence
an election." 5 Hard money-sometimes called federal money-is a contri-
bution that is subject to FECA's disclosure requirements and limitations." 6
Many of the soft money contributions to political parties were substantially
larger than FECA allowed."' Organizations primarily used soft money for
"issue advocacy," which political parties could use without FECA regula-
tion as long as they did not use the "magic words" that expressly advocated
voting for or against a certain candidate." 8 The Court cited "Elect John
Smith" and "Vote Against Jane Doe" as examples of magic words that sepa-
rated express advocacy from issue advocacy.' In response to this circum-
vention of federal regulations, Congress passed the Bipartisan Reform Act
of 2002 (BCRA), 20 which amended several campaign reform laws and
made soft money subject to FECA regulations. 2'
In McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 122 several parties chal-
lenged BCRA on free speech and association grounds. 123 The petitioners
argued strict scrutiny should apply to the BCRA limitations because it af-
fected both contributions and expenditures. 24 What mattered to the Court,
however, was whether BCRA burdened speech in a way that contribution
limits alone did not. 25 The Court concluded that BCRA did not impose re-
strictions on speech any more than the contribution limits upheld in Buck-
ley.'26 The Court also rejected the argument that BCRA imposed associa-
113. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 122 (2003).
114. Id. at 123.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 122.
117. Id. at 125.
118. Id. at 126.
119. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 126.
120. Id. at 132. The Bipartisan Reform Act of 2002 is more popularly known as the
McCain-Feingold Act and has been described as the most sweeping change in campaign
finance law since FECA. Adam Winkler, "Other People's Money": Corporations, Agency
Costs, and Campaign Finance Law, 92 GEO. L.J. 871, 935 (2004).
121. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 114, 123. BCRA amended FECA, the Communications Act
of 1934, and sections of the United States Code. Id. at 114.
122. 540 U.S. 93 (2003). McConnell is a long and complicated case that dealt with more
issues than just soft money, but for the purposes of this note only its holding regarding con-
tribution limits is important. Id.
123. Id. at 93.
124. Id. at 138.
125. Id. at 138-39.
126. Id. at 139.
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tional burdens different from the contribution limits in Buckley because
BCRA prohibited any cooperation among national, state, and local political
committees in conducting campaigns. 127 The Court did not interpret BCRA
as the petitioners did and concluded that the "modest" impact that BCRA
placed on party committees' associational rights did not warrant strict scru-
tiny. 2 8 Thus, the Court applied "the less rigorous scrutiny applicable to con-
tribution limits" upheld in Buckley to the BCRA soft money and issue ad
provisions.
29
In upholding these provisions, the Court broadened its view of what the
governmental interest in preventing the reality and appearance of corruption
entailed. 3 ' The Court moved beyond only quid pro quo corruption that
emanates from direct contributions, concluding the soft money donations
that averted congressional regulation were just as dangerous to the demo-
cratic election system as were direct contributions.' 3 ' The record in McCon-
nell indicated copious examples of national parties giving access to federal
candidates and incumbents in exchange for large soft money contribu-
tions.3 2 The dangers of these types of donations were the same posed by
direct donations--officeholders deciding issues based on who contributed to
their election, not on the merits or what his or her constituents wanted.
33
The Court also found the effects of soft money contributions were more
difficult to detect, so it decided the best way to prevent soft money's cor-
rupting influences was to remove it as a temptation. 34 Thus, the govern-
ment's strong interests in preventing corruption and its appearance led the
Court to uphold BCRA's soft money provision.
135
Just as in Buckley and Shrink, the Court acknowledged that the gov-
ernment's interest-to prevent the actual and apparent corruption of candi-
dates and government officials-was a sufficiently important interest to
justify contribution limits. 3 6 Although the petitioners argued that Congress
had not provided any evidence proving the existence of real or perceived
corruption, the Court, just as it did in Shrink, deferred to legislative findings
127. Id. at 141.
128. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 141.
129. Id.
130. Frances R. Hill, Putting Voters First: An Essay on the Jurisprudence of Citizen
Sovereignty in Federal Election Law, 60 U. MtAMI L. REV. 155, 176 (2006).
131. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 152-53.
132. Id. at 150.
133. Id. at 153.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 154.
136. Id. at 143.
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that soft money had influenced the congressional agenda.1 37 The Court em-
phasized that it had consistently interpreted the definition of corruption very
broadly and did not limit it to the "simple cash-for-votes corruption."'38 Be-
cause the government's important interest in preventing actual corruption
and its appearance satisfied the less rigorous scrutiny standard applicable for
regulations such as BCRA, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Con-
gress's regulation over soft money contributions.' 39
Neither the Shrink nor the McConnell case directly challenged Buck-
ley's holding on expenditure limits. 4 ° Consequently, Randall was the first
case to raise the constitutionality of expenditure limits since the landmark
case thirty years earlier. 4 ' Because of the increasing hostility toward Buck-
ley by members of the Court, many legal scholars and political pundits alike
thought that Randall might be the case that changed Buckley's holding on
expenditure limits. 42 The Court used Randall, however, as a chance to illu-
minate Buckley's holding on contribution limits and paid little attention to
expenditure limits, leaving Buckley as strong a precedent as ever.'43
III. THE CASE
A. Facts
The Randall case began as a consolidation of three separate civil ac-
tions by candidates, voters, political parties and political action committees
(PACs) from Vermont.'" All three suits challenged Act 64, which set con-
tribution and expenditure limits on campaigns for state offices in Ver-
mont. 4  The parties alleged that certain provisions violated the First
137. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 149-50. The Court cited evidence that Congress failed to
pass tobacco and generic drug legislation and tort reform because of the influence of soft
money. Id. at 150 (citations omitted).
138. Id. at 150.
139. Id. at 224.
140. Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2507 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
141. Id.
142. See sources cited supra note 7, 50.
143. See discussion infra Part IV.
144. Landell v. Sorrell, 118 F. Supp. 2d 459, 463 (Vt. 2000) ("Landell 1"). The three
separate actions were: Marcella Landell, Donald Brunelle, and the Vermont Right to Life
Committee, Inc., Political Committee, who sued Vermont Attorney General William Sorrell
and Vermont's fourteen state attorneys on May 18, 1999, alleging that Act 64 violated their
right to speech and association under the First Amendment. Id. Three months later, a group
including Neil Randall and the Vermont Libertarian Party sued on similar grounds, and the
court consolidated the case with Landell L Id. In February 2000, the Vermont Republican
State Committee filed a similar suit but also challenged the application of Act 64 to political
parties and committees, and the court consolidated the case with Landell I in March. Id.
145. Id. at 462.
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Amendment rights to speech and association of individuals, candidates, po-
litical parties, and PACs.146 There were several other groups and individuals
interested in keeping Act 64 intact, and these "Defendant-Intervenors" suc-
cessfully intervened in each case.147 Landall I, which included three differ-
ent parties-the Vermont Attorney General's office, the plaintiffs, and the
Defendant-Intervenors-finally made it to trial in the United States District
Court of Vermont in the summer of 2000.48
1. The Challenged Provisions
a. Act 64's contribution limits
Act 64 set various limits on the contribution amount that a candidate
could receive from a "single source" in a two-year election cycle.49 Candi-
dates for state representative could receive no more than $200 from a single
source. ° The limit was $300 for candidates for state senator.'5' The legisla-
ture allotted a slightly higher contribution limit of $400 for candidates for
statewide offices such as governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state,
state treasurer, state auditor and attorney general. 5 2 Act 64 allowed political
parties and PACs to raise significantly more money, permitting those enti-
ties to take contributions up to $2000 from a single source. 53 In addition to
these limitations, no candidate, political party or PAC could allow more than
twenty-five percent of total contributions to come from non-residents of
Vermont or a political party or committee that was not organized in Ver-
mont."'54
b. Act 64's expenditure limits
The legislature also set limits on how much a candidate could spend on
his or her campaign. 5 Act 64 restricted gubernatorial candidates from
146. Id. at 463-64.
147. Id. at 463. The defendant-intervenors include the following: the Vermont Public
Interest Research Group; the League of Women Voters of Vermont; Rural Vermont; Vermont
Older Women's League; Vermont Alliance of Conservation Votes; Mike Fiorello; Marion
Gray; Phil Hoff; Frank Huard; Karen Kitzmiller; Marion Milne; Daryl Pillsbury; Elizabeth
Ready; Nancy Rice; Cheryl Rivers; and Maria Thompson. Id.
148. Id.
149. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2805 (1997). A single source included not only individuals
but also political parties and PACs. Id. at § 2805(a).
150. Id. § 2805(a).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. § 2805(c).
154. Id. § 2805(c).
155. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2805(a).
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spending more than $300,000 during a two-year election cycle,"5 6 and a can-
didate for lieutenant governor could spend no more than $100,000.1'7 Act 64
also limited candidates for secretary of state, state treasure, state auditor, and
attorney general to $45,000.5' Finally, citizens seeking office for state sena-
tor and state representative could spend no more than $4000 and $2000,
respectively, in a two-year election cycle.1
59
c. Act 64's related campaign expenditures
Several of Act 64's other challenged provisions broadened the scope of
what constitutes a contribution and an expenditure."6 For instance, the sta-
tute considered any "related campaign expenditure" by someone other than
a candidate "intended to promote the election of a specific candidate or
group of candidates, or the defeat of an opposing candidate or group of can-
didates" an expenditure by and contribution to that candidate, if it was "in-
tentionally facilitated by, solicited by or approved by the candidate or the
candidate's political committee.' 6' If the related campaign expenditure was
not more than fifty dollars, then Act 64 considered it to be a contribution to
the candidate and not an expenditure by the candidate.162 Lastly, Act 64 set
limits on how much money political parties and committees could spend on
behalf of a candidate. 63 If a political party or political committee had an
expenditure that "primarily benefits" six or fewer candidates associated with
that party or committee, then a presumption existed that this related cam-
paign expenditure was for the candidate or candidates involved and thus
considered a contribution. 1"4 That presumption did not exist, however, if the
expenditure "substantially benefits" more than six candidates and was for
the purpose of voter turnout, platform promotion or similar activities, all of
which must fit criteria set by Act 64.
t65
156. Id. § 2805a(a)(1).
157. Id. § 2805a(a)(2).
158. Id. § 2805a(a)(3).
159. Id. § 2805a(a)(4)-(5).
160. Id. § 2809.
161. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2809(b)-(c).
162. Id. § 2809(a)-(c).
163. Id. § 2809(d).
164. Id.
165. Id. § 2809(d). For an expenditure not to be a "related campaign expenditure," it must
satisfy the following three qualifications:
(1) The expenditures were made in connection with a campaign event whose purpose was to
provide a group of voters with the opportunity to meet the candidate personally. (2) The
expenditures .were made only for refreshments and related supplies that were consumed at




2. The Lower Courts'Decisions
The United States District Court for Vermont found that the contribu-
tion limits imposed by Act 64 were constitutional because they passed the
test promulgated by the Supreme Court in Buckley. 66 The expenditure lim-
its, however, were an "unprecedented and impermissible extension of Buck-
ley" and thus unconstitutional. 67 The district court also determined that the
twenty-five percent limit on out of state contributions was an unconstitu-
tional infringement on both a candidate's and contributor's First Amend-
ment rights of free speech and association. 168 Finding that the provision re-
garding contributions from political parties to candidates was not per se
unconstitutional, the court ruled nevertheless that the respective monetary
levels of the restriction was unconstitutionally low. 169 The district court,
however, upheld the $2000 contribution limit to political parties and PACs
and the various contributions limits by PACs to candidates. 7 ' Finally, the
district court held that the provision requiring related campaign expenditures
by non-candidates to be considered a contribution was constitutional. 7' The
parties subsequently cross-appealed the district court's ruling.'72
On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district
court's holdings regarding contribution limits but not expenditure limits.
73
The court decided that Buckley allowed expenditure limits as long as they
were narrowly tailored to protect a compelling government interest, which is
the strict scrutiny standard of review.'74 Based on the evidence and findings
of the district court, the court of appeals held that the Vermont legislature
had established the following two compelling interests to validate the ex-
penditures limits: "preventing the reality and appearance of corruption, and
protecting the time of candidates and elected officials."' 175 Although the evi-
dence and findings at trial showed compelling interests, the court of appeals
could not discern from the record whether Act 64 was narrowly tailored
enough to maintain the government's interests.'76 The district court had de-
termined that a candidate could run an effective campaign with the expendi-
166. Landell v. Sorrell, 118 F. Supp. 2d 459, 463 (Vt. 2000) ("Landell 1").
167. Id. at 463-64.




172. See Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2004) ("Landell ").
173. Id. The Second Circuit remanded the case for the district court to decide whether the
expenditure limits were narrowly tailored to protect a compelling governmental interest. Id. at
124-26.
174. Id. at 124-26.
175. Id. at 124.
176. Id. at 135.
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tures limits but did not examine whether there was a way to continue to
serve the government's interests and infringe less on the plaintiffs' First
Amendment rights. 7 7 The court of appeals thus remanded the case to deter-
mine whether there were viable alternatives, such as a higher ceiling, to the
expenditure limits established in Act 64.178 The parties appealed and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the constitutionality of Act
64's contribution limits and expenditure limits.
179
B. Reasoning
This section examines the Supreme Court's decision in Randall. The
Court's ruling consisted Justice Breyer's plurality opinion. 8 ° The plurality
held that Act 64's contribution limits were unconstitutional. 8' The plurality
dealt with Act 64's expenditure limits very briefly, holding that because of
the doctrine of stare decisis and because Buckley was a well-established
precedent, the expenditure limits were unconstitutional. 8 1 Chief Justice Ro-
berts joined in the entire opinion, and Justice Alito joined the portions go-
verning contribution limits. 83 Justice Alito wrote a concurring opinion, in
which he concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. 18' Justice Kenne-
dy concurred in the judgment but did not join in the plurality opinion. 5
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, filed an opinion and concurred
only in the judgment, arguing that contribution limits should be per se un-
177. Id.
178. Landell11, 382 F.3d at 135.
179. Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2487 (2006).
180. See discussion infra Part III.B. 1.
181. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at2499.
182. Id. at 2487-91.
183. Id. at 2481.
184. Id. at 2500-01 (Alito, J., concurring). In his concurring opinion, Justice Alito be-
lieved that the respondents failed to appropriately ask the Court to revisit Buckley, so he did
not concur in Justice Breyer's opinion concerning expenditure limits. Id. at 2500. "Only as a
backup argument, an afterthought almost," Justice Alito argued, "do respondents make a
naked plea for us to 'revisit Buckley."' Id. Further, Justice Alito felt that the respondents did
not discuss stare decisis or why the Court should reconsider precedent. Id. Because of the
respondents' "incomplete presentation," he thought the Court should have refused to reex-
amine Buckley at all. Id. at 2500-01.
185. Id. at 2501 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Although Justice Kennedy agreed with the
plurality that Vermont's contribution limits were unconstitutional, he was skeptical of the
current campaign finance system and thus concurred only in the judgment. Id He noted the
Court was responsible for the creation and propulsion of the campaign finance system today.
Id. Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy admitted that Supreme Court Justices have little if any
experience on which to base these judgments, and there is no body of law to offer guidance.
Id Despite his exasperation with the political system, Justice Kennedy concurred in the
judgment because he felt Vermont's contribution limits were too low. Id.
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constitutional."s6 Agreeing with the court of appeals, Justice Stevens filed a
dissenting opinion in which he advocated a remand to determine if the ex-
penditure limits were too low. 18 7 Finally, Justice Souter, joined by Justice
Ginsburg and in part by Justice Stevens, argued in his dissenting opinion
that the contribution limits were not unconstitutionally low.
88
1. Under Buckley, Act 64 's Contribution Limits Were Unconstitu-
tionally Low
Deciding whether Act 64's contribution limits were constitutional re-
quired a complex analysis.'89 The parties in Randall agreed with the Buckley
Court's approach to determining whether contribution limits were constitu-
tional, but they disagreed whether Act 64's limits were so restrictive that
they violated the First Amendment.' 90 The Buckley Court applied a standard
of scrutiny that required contribution limits to be "closely drawn" to meet a
"sufficiently important interest."' 9' The Randall plurality adopted this stan-
dard to determine the constitutionality of Act 64's contribution limits but
implemented a two step review.'92 First, the plurality conducted a quick re-
view of Act 64 to determine if any "danger signs" were present. 93 The pres-
ence of danger signs raised a suspicion that contribution limits were not
closely drawn, which could have the undesired effect of undermining elec-
toral fairness by impeding a challenger's efforts to unseat an incumbent,
thus reducing democratic accountability. 94
The plurality identified four danger signs present in Act 64's contribu-
tion limits.' 95 The first danger sign was that the limits applied per election
cycle, not per election. 96 Thus, Act 64 grouped primary and general elec-
186. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
187. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2506-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Mainly arguing for the
constitutionality of expenditure limits, Justice Stevens argued that Buckley was not so strong
a precedent that the Court should not overrule it. Id. at 2507. He also believed that the Court
should not equate money with speech, which he contended it was doing by prohibiting ex-
penditure limits. Id. at 2508. Finally, he argued that protecting the time of elected officials
was an important governmental interest, stating that the Framers of the Constitution would
"have been appalled by the impact of modem fundraising practices on the ability of elected
officials to perform their public responsibilities." Id. at 2510.
188. See discussion infra Part III.B.3.
189. See Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2491.
190. Id.
191. Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976)).
192. Id. at 2492.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 2492-93.
195. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2493-94. Justice Thomas also examined these danger signs in
his concurring opinion. Id. at 2503 (Thomas, J., concurring).
196. Id. at 2493.
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tions into the same category.'97 The second danger sign was Act 64's appli-
cation of the same limitations "to both contributions from individuals and
from political parties."' 98 The plurality identified the following as the third
and fourth danger sign, on which it seems to place the most importance:1 99
Act 64's limits were the lowest in the country200 and were much lower than
any contribution limits the Court previously had upheld.2"' To the plurality,
the presence of these danger signs meant that Act 64's contribution limits
may violate the First Amendment, so it must continue to the second step of
its analysis.202
Because danger signs were present, the plurality then "examine[d] the
record independently and carefully to determine whether Act 64's contribu-
tion limits are 'closely drawn' to match the State's interests. 2 3 In conduct
ing this independent examination of the record, the plurality found five fac-
tors, discussed below, that convinced it to believe that Act 64's contribution
limits were too stringent and thus violated the First Amendment.0 4
a. Act 64 restricted a challenger's ability to run a competitive
campaign
Based on the evidence presented by the petitioners' and the respon-
dents' expert witnesses in the district court, the plurality decided that al-
though the limits might not affect the average race, they had a considerable
effect on competitive races.205 The petitioners' experts focused on the com-
petitive races in Vermont and determined that in 1998 Republican legisla-
tive challengers for competitive seats would have had the funds available
reduced between eighteen percent and fifty-three percent. 0 6 The experts also
testified that political parties target competitive races, resulting in the party
contributing more money to these campaigns in an effort to win.207 Their
studies showed that Act 64 reduced political party contributions in these
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See id. at 2494.
200. Id.
201. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2493-94. The plurality noted that Act 64's limit was roughly
one-sixth of the limit the Court upheld in Shrink. Id. at 2494.
202. Id. at 2494. If no danger signs were present, the plurality presumably would have
deemed the contribution limits constitutional because they were similar to limits in other
states and to limits the Court had upheld previously. See id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 2494-95.
205. Id. at 2495-96.
206. Id. at 2495. The 1998 elections were the last elections to take place before the regu-
lations took effect. Id.
207. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2495.
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races an average of eighty-five percent in legislative races and ninety-nine
percent in gubernatorial races.2 °8
The respondents' expert evidence was not as persuasive to the plurali-
ty.209 The respondents' experts focused on Vermont's average campaign and
concluded that Act 64 would have a minimal effect in the state. 2 ° The cen-
terpiece of the experts' evidence was a series of studies indicating that Act
64 would have affected only a small proportion of the contributions made to
all the campaigns in Vermont over the last three election cycles." ' The plu-
rality noted that the trial and appellate courts had erroneously relied on this
evidence, which was based on averages, in finding the contribution limits
constitutional.2t 2 Evidence relating to average races did not effectively an-
swer the question of whether a challenger could run an effective campaign
against an incumbent, because competitive races are usually much more
expensive than the average race.2t 3 Consequently, the petitioners' evidence
raised an inference that the contributions limits violated the First Amend-
ment.2 4
b. Act 64 infringed on individuals' right to associate in a politi-
cal party
Because Act 64's contribution limits were the same for political parties
and individuals, the plurality concluded the statute infringed on Vermonters'
right to associate.15 Under the limits, a statewide political party consisting
of smaller local parties around the state could contribute a maximum of
$400 to a gubernatorial candidate.2t 6 Additionally, Act 64 treated in kind
contributions the same as direct monetary contributions, so giving campaign
buttons and food counted against the amount of money the political party
contributed to a candidate.217 The plurality felt this restriction impinged on
an individual's right to associate under the First Amendment and considered
it another factor supporting the unconstitutionality of Act 64.218
208. Id.
209. See id. at 2496.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 2496.
212. Id.
213. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2496.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 2497.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 2497-98.
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c. Act 64's language concerning volunteer services was too
broad
Although Act 64 did not recognize time spent as a volunteer as a con-
tribution to a candidate, the plurality concluded that money spent by volun-
teers during their volunteer services would be considered a contribution.219 If
the contribution limits were reasonably high, the plurality noted, the absenc6
of more precise language would make little difference.22° Act 64's limits,
however, were low, so whether such volunteer expenditures counted as con-
tributions would make a significant difference on the nature and extent of
activities in which volunteers could participate.221 The uncertainty of the
provision, the high likelihood of an inadvertent violation of the provision,
and its serious adverse effects on a candidate led the plurality to add the
volunteer provision to the list of factors weighing against the contribution
limits being closely drawn to pass scrutiny.222
d. Act 64 had no inflation provision
The plurality also distinguished Act 64's contribution limits from those
the Court upheld in the past based on the Vermont legislature's failure to
insert an inflation provision.223 According to the plurality, the $200 contribu-
tion limit for House races in 1997 had a real value in 2006 of $160.66.224 As
a result of the lack of such a provision, legislation would be necessary to
prevent the real value from continuously declining. 225 The plurality also
pleaded its case once more that Act 64 disadvantaged challengers, noting
that this legislative burden fell on incumbents who may choose to protect
their seat and not enact a legislative adjustment for inflation in order to fur-
ther limit the effectiveness of a challenger's campaign.226
219. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2498.
220. Id. at 2499.
221. Id. at 2498-99. Justice Breyer provided the following example of an adverse effect
that a provision violation could have on a candidate: "Such supporters will have to keep
careful track of all miles driven, postage supplied (500 stamps equals $200), pencils and pads
used, and so forth. And any carelessness in this respect can prove costly, perhaps generating a
headline, 'Campaign laws violated,' that works serious harm to the candidate." Id.
222. Id. at 2499.
223. Id.
224. Id.




e. No special justification existed for Act 64's infringements on
rights of free speech and association
The fifth and final factor leaning toward the unconstitutionality of Act
64's contribution limits was the lack of any "special justification" that
would allow the plurality to rationalize the burdens placed on the rights of
free speech and association by Act 64's low contribution limits. 227 Accord-
ing to the plurality, the governmental interests advocated by Vermont in this
case were no different than those promoted in Buckley.228 Further, the State
failed to show that its interest in preventing corruption or its appearance was
more pressing in Vermont than in any other state. 229 The plurality concluded
that these five factors-the adverse effect on a challenger's ability to run a
competitive campaign, the infringement on associational rights, the broad
language concerning volunteer services, the lack of an inflation provision,
and the absence of special justification for the great imposition on free
speech and association rights-taken together, 3° forced it to conclude that
Act 64's contribution limits "disproportionately burden[s] numerous First
Amendment interests, and consequently, . . . violates the First Amend-
ment."
231
2. Justice Thomas's Concurring Opinion
Justice Thomas's concurrence, which Justice Scalia joined, advocated
overturning Buckley because it did not provide enough protection for politi-
cal speech and because the Court had not provided a workable standard to
apply its principles.232 He disagreed with Buckley, and the plurality in this
case, for distinguishing expenditure and contribution limits on the basis that
contribution limits are less of an infringement on political speech because
there is an intermediary (the candidate) between the contributor and the ac-
tual speech. 233 Expenditure limits also include an intermediary, Justice Tho-
mas maintained, because a candidate usually uses some vehicle to commu-
nicate his or her message.234 In his view, the Court should overrule Buckley




230. Id. The plurality briefly addressed the option of severing the provisions and deciding
their constitutionality piecemeal. Id. at 2499-2500. While noting that the plurality objected to
severing because of constitutional ramifications, the severability of Act 64 is beyond the
scope of this note. Id. at 2500.
231. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2499-2500.
232. Id. at 2502 (Thomas, J., concurring).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 2502.
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because both limits violate the heart of the First Amendment-the freedom
of political expression.235
Justice Thomas also disagreed with the plurality's stare decisis argu-
ment for not overruling Buckley.236 In addition to inadequately protecting
political speech, he believed that the Court's ongoing failure to apply Buck-
ley consistently was further reason not to allow stare decisis to interfere with
its demise.237 When precedent has faulty reasoning and an unworkable out-
come, the Supreme Court "has never felt constrained to follow
precedent., 238 In Justice Thomas's mind, the plurality's two-pronged test
provided an unfeasible guide for states attempting to conform to the Court's
rule.239 Justice Thomas criticized as unclear the plurality's reasoning regard-
ing when contribution limits were so low as to cause danger signs to ap-
pear.
240
He also considered the plurality's comparison of Vermont's limits to
other states as "nothing more than a moving target., 24' Further, he disagreed
with the plurality's comparison of Act 64 to limits the Court previously
upheld.242 The Court in Shrink reiterated that Buckley did not create a consti-
tutional minimum for contribution limits, but according to Justice Thomas,
the plurality here effectively used Shrink as a constitutional minimum.243
Although these danger signs confirmed the plurality's suggestion that Act
64's limits are low, Justice Thomas concluded that they provided no guid-
ance as to whether the limits were closely drawn to fit their objectives.2"
According to Justice Thomas, the plurality's application of Buckley gives
the Court a "license to simply strike down any limits that just seem to be too





237. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2502.
238. Id. at 2503 (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306 (2004) (plurality opinion)).
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 2504. Justice Thomas argued that if the Vermont legislature was able to per-
suade other state legislatures to lower their contribution limits, then Act 64 would pass this
part of the plurality's test. Id.
242. Id.
243. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2504 (Thomas, J., concurring).
244. Id.
245. Id. at 2506.
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3. Justice Souter's Dissent
In the second part of his dissent,246 Justice Souter elaborated on why
the Court should have upheld the court of appeals' decision that the contri-
bution limits were constitutional.247 He argued that Vermont's contribution
limits were not significant departures from those the court upheld in earlier
cases and those adopted recently by other states.248 Further, he contended
that the Court should defer to the legislature on this issue because it had
better knowledge of the measures necessary to accomplish their objec-
tives. 49 Justice Souter acknowledged that there are instances where the
Court should not defer to state legislatures, but there was sufficient evidence
in the record in this case to allow the Court to defer to the Vermont legisla-
ture.
2 50
In the final section of his dissent, Justice Souter examined some of the
key sections of the plurality's reasoning for finding the contribution limits
unconstitutional.25 1 First, he refuted the plurality's view that Act 64's provi-
sion that a volunteer's expenses count as a contribution to the candidate
would limit volunteerism. 252 He argued that only if the contribution limits
were "teetering on the edge of unconstitutionality," the volunteer provision
might render the limits unconstitutional.253 Second, the plurality's opinion
that the absence of an inflation provision is another factor weighing against
the contribution limits constitutionality was even less persuasive to Justice
Souter" He countered by arguing the challenge to Act 64 was "to the law
as it is, not to a law that may have a different impact after future infla-
tion., 255 Third, Justice Souter disagreed with the plurality's view that politi-
cal parties should not be subject to the same contribution limit as individu-
246. Id. at 2512 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg joined in the entire dissenting
opinion, while Justice Stevens joined in only parts two and three. Id. In the first part of his
dissent, Justice Souter argued that Buckley did not address all of the governmental interests
that Vermont advocated in regard to expenditure limits. Id. at 2511-12. Vermont argued it
had a significant interest in reducing the amount of time that candidates and state officials
spent raising money for their campaigns. Id. According to Justice Souter, the Court should
have applied Buckley's framework to determine whether the expenditure limits were the least
restrictive means of meeting the state's objectives. Id. at 2512.
247. Id. at2512-16.
248. Id. at 2512-13 (citations omitted).
249. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2513 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter cited the testimony
of one candidate: "If I have only got an hour at night when I get home to return calls, I am
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als, because in his view, rich individuals have the same interests as political
parties in putting money into competitive races.256 Additionally, individuals
may use political parties to avoid the individual limits and still get their
money to certain candidates.257 In his final point, Justice Souter argued that
Act 64's provision regarding "related campaign expenditures," '258 which
promulgated rules about which political party activities constitute a contri-
bution to a candidate, did not place such a burden on parties and candidates
to cause a "constitutionally offensive encumbrance."'259 Thus, Justice Souter
advocated upholding the constitutionality of the Act 64's contribution lim-
its.260
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Buckley Is Here to Stay
Despite the anticipation that Randall would change the state of cam-
paign finance laws,26' the Court remained steadfast to Buckley and showed
no signs of changing anytime soon. Justice Breyer and Chief Justice Roberts
are clearly in favor of staying with Buckley regarding both contribution and
expenditure limits. 262 Although Justice Alito avoided answering the question
of whether the Court should overrule Buckley, he would probably side with
Justice Breyer and the Chief Justice in a similar situation in the future. He
had the option to dissent or side with Justices Thomas and Scalia and chose
not to, indicating that he wants to preserve the constitutionality of contribu-
tion limits and the unconstitutionality of expenditure limits. Justice Thomas
and Justice Scalia would like to overturn Buckley and render all contribution
limits unconstitutional,263 and they concurred in the judgment only because
the plurality struck down Vermont's contribution limits. Justice Kennedy
would have joined with Justice Breyer and the Chief Justice, but he said his
skepticism of the campaign finance systems prevented him from doing s0 .
2 1
The dissenters-Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg-disagreed with the
plurality on contributions limits only because they believed Vermont's lim-
its were not too low. 2 65 One important result of Randall, therefore, is it
256. Id..
257. Id.
258. For Act 64's definition of related campaign expenditures, see VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17,
§ 2809(b)-(c); see also discussion supra Part III.A. 1.c.
259. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2515-16.
260. Id. at 2516.
261. See sources cited supra note 7.
262. See discussion supra Part III.B. 1.
263. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
264. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2501 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
265. Id. at 2512-16. See discussion supra Part III.B.3.
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shows that the Court-by a seven to two margin-favors contribution limits
and disfavors expenditure limits by a six to three margin. Because the two
new Justices, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, are in favor of contri-
bution limits and not expenditure limits, it appears that Buckley's holding on
these limits will continue to be the law of the land.
Much of the anticipation of the Randall decision was in regards to ex-
penditure limits, however, not contribution limits. 2 66 As stated in the Intro-
duction to this note, Randall did not change the law regarding expenditure
limits,167 nor did it provide an indication that it will change in the future.
26 8
Thus, constitutional laws limiting the amount of money a candidate may
spend on his or her campaign are not on the horizon.
B. A New Standard of Review for Contribution Limits: Semi-Strict Scru-
tiny
Randall illuminated what the Buckley Court hinted at thirty years
ago-the Court had created a new tier a scrutiny for contribution limits. The
scrutiny employed in Buckley was a mix of intermediate and strict scruti-
ny.269 For the first prong of this new standard, the governmental interest, the
Court borrowed the "important" interest the government must demonstrate
for the intermediate scrutiny standard.27 ° In Shrink, the Court denied that it
used intermediate scrutiny in Buckley, claiming intermediate scrutiny was
not an appropriate standard for communicative action.271 The Court's analy-
sis and language in Buckley and Randall, however, is strikingly similar to
analysis and language used in cases where the Court expressly applied its
intermediate scrutiny standard. For example, in Craig v. Boren,2" a sex dis-
crimination case that established intermediate scrutiny as a standard of re-
view,273 the Court set out a standard that required a law to serve an "impor-
tant" governmental interest that is "substantially related" to that interest.
1
1
In Buckley and again in Randall, the Court said that contribution limits must
266. See sources cited supra note 7.
267. See Chemerinsky, supra note 10.
268. See discussion supra Part I.
269. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25-28 (1976).
270. Id. at 25-27.
271. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 386 (2000).
272. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
273. Id. at 220 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the new standard seemed to come
"out of thin air"); see also Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L.
REv. 955, 987 (1984).
274. Craig, 429 U.S. at 199-200; see also Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 210-11




serve a "sufficiently important" governmental interest.275 Thus, the differ-
ence between intermediate scrutiny and the scrutiny employed in Buckley
and Randall is simply that contribution limits must serve a sufficiently im-
portant interest instead of just an important interest. The first prong of the
standard of review for contribution limits looks incredibly similar to the first
prong of intermediate scrutiny.
For the second prong of its review of contribution limits, the Buckley
Court said contribution limits must be "closely drawn" to serve a sufficient-
ly important governmental interest.276 In Randall, the Court borrowed the
language from Buckley,2 77 but began using the term "narrowly tailored" in-
terchangeably with "closely drawn. 278 The term "narrowly tailored" is one
the Court uses when it applies its strict scrutiny standard, but the law must
be narrowly tailored to serve a "compelling" governmental interest, not an
"important" one. 27 9 Further, in McConnell Justice Kennedy maintained that
Buckley used "'closely drawn' scrutiny for contribution limits and strict
scrutiny for expenditure limits, 280 and Justice Thomas's concurrence in Ran-
dall indicated that the Court does not use strict scrutiny to review contribu-
tion limits. 28 ' Thus, the Randall Court did not use strict scrutiny, but bor-
rowed the term "narrowly tailored" and a term it coined in Buckley, "closely
drawn," '282 and created a new standard of review: semi-strict scrutiny. This
new scrutiny derives its first prong from intermediate scrutiny and its second
prong from strict scrutiny, and on the scale of standards of review, falls
somewhere between the two.
How does a legislature make sure that its contribution limits can sur-
vive semi-strict scrutiny? Randall indicates that a legislature should ensure
that its limits are not the lowest in the nation and are not lower than what the
Court has upheld previously. 283 Somewhat less importantly, a legislature
should make its contribution limits applicable per election, not per election
cycle, and should not apply the same limits to political parties and individu-
als.284 If the Court does not detect these danger signs, it will most likely not
275. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976); Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2491
(2006) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo).
276. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25.
277. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2491.
278. See id. at 2494, 2499.
279. See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306, 326 (2003); Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774-75 (2002).
280. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 307 (2003).
281. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2502 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("I would overrule Buckley and
subject both the contribution and expenditure restrictions of Act 64 to strict scrutiny.").
282. A Westlaw word search for the term "closely drawn" in Supreme Court cases indi-
cates the Court first used the term in any context in Buckley.
283. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2493-94.
284. Id. at 2493.
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conduct an independent review of the record and will rule the limits consti-
tutional s.2 5 Although a Court will not automatically invalidate contribution
limits if one or more of the danger signs are present, it seems more likely
that when it conducts an independent review it will find that the limits are
not closely drawn.286
Another important result of Randall may very well be the Court de-
monstrating that it will not allow any and all contribution limits to pass con-
stitutional muster. But the case also elucidated and reemphasized Buckley,
which many scholars suspected would soon fall, as the law of the land.287
Randall also succeeded in doing what the cases since Buckley failed to do--
identifying semi-strict scrutiny as the standard of review, which courts will
use when deciding contribution limit challenges. State legislatures have re-
ceived a shot across the bow warning them that if they are unsure at what
level to set their contribution limits, it should err on the high rather than low
side. Whether legislatures will heed that warning in order to avoid litigation
remains to be seen.
Christopher A. McNulty*
285. See id. at 2494. The Court did not mandate that these were the only danger signs that
would cause it to conduct an independent review; it is the only instruction, however, the
Court has given on the matter. Id.
286. See id. A constitutional challenge to Arkansas's contribution limits would probably
fail. Pursuant to law that went into effect in 2003, a person may contribute a maximum of
$2000 to a candidate per election for statewide office or any other public office. ARK. CODE
ANN. § 7-6-203(a)(I)(A)-(2)(A) (LEXIS Supp. 2005). Arkansas law, however, treats primary
and general elections separately, so a candidate may receive $2000 from the same contributor
in each the primary and general election. Id. § 7-6-201(7) (LEXIS Supp. 2005). With a con-
tribution limit of $2500, political parties may contribute slightly more to a candidate than
individuals and corporations. Id. § 7-6-203(d) (LEXIS Supp. 2005). None of the danger signs
cataloged in Randall exist in the Arkansas statutes.
287. See sources cited supra note 7.
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